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Abstract
This explorative paper argues that the central problem of economic organization is
adaptation to unforeseen contingencies. However, flexibility is a rather neglected issue in
the theory of economic organization. This contrasts with much organization theory, in which
the seeking and processing of information about the organization's key uncertainties is seen
as a determinant of organizational form. The notion of incomplete contracts is argued to
provide a means to bridging ideas from organizational economics and organization theory,
particularly organizational learning. Incomplete contracts are not only important because
they provide room for incentive problems, but more importantly because they allow firms
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involve strongly complementary problem-solving activities. 
Keywords: 
The theory of economic organization, incomplete firm contracts, organizational learning,
the existence of the firm.
JEL Classification:
D23, L14, D83
ISBN 87-7873-001-5
11. Introduction
This paper links up with the literature on economic organization, but -- in contrast to this
literature -- is founded on knowledge-based premises.  Rather than conceptualizing the firm
as an entity that is primarily kept together by transaction cost minimization, it seeks to
extend the view of the firm as an entity whose primary role is to acquire, combine, utilize
and upgrade knowledge [29, 9, 52, 25, 6].  More specifically, I seek to elaborate and extend
from an economic perspective the idea that various types of economic organization primarily
derive their raison d'etre from their ability to adapt to partly unanticipated changes in
knowledge, much of which may be generated by the firm itself.  Thus, the existence of the
firm is rationalized in terms of its function as a repository of knowledge and seedbed of
learning, rather than in terms of aligning incentives (as in [53,39, 21].  This  overall
perspective is clearly related to the point in much organization theory that the organizational
dynamic that is most determinative of organizational forms is the seeking and processing of
information about the organization's key uncertainties ([52] is a particularly vivid, recent
statement of this position). 
A basic conceptualization of the firm as an adaptive and cognitive mechanism can
be found in the seminal early contributions to the theory of economic organization [24, 4,
19, 32].  Moreover, as already suggested, it will certainly not come as a surprise to modern
contributors to organization theory (e.g., [52, 33, 34]) or evolutionary economics (e.g., [12,
54]) that the firm may be conceptualized in this way.  But it is only present in modern
mainstream economics in the distorted form of the argument that economic organization
reflects efficient adaptation to the possibility of partly unanticipated strategic behavior, such
as 'opportunism' [53, 26, 27,17].
One convenient way of conceptualizing the idea that various types of economic
organization -- firms, hybrids and markets, to use Oliver Williamson's [53] typology -- are
primarily instruments of adaptation to the partly unexpected is to that they are option-
providing institutions -- or, if you like, they embody reserves [29, 30].  Clearly, markets
provide options in a rather general sense: They feature a menu of input and service options,
and therefore allow us to postpone decisions.  Hybrid forms, such as network governance,
joint ventures, and much else, may be understood in option terms, too -- indeed, this has
2been a strong argument in favor of strategies of outsourcing on the part of firms placed in
turbulent industries.  Companies competing in such environments, such as, Nike, Inc. or
Benetton, have based much of their competitive success on developing and maintaining
flexible supplier relations.  This has allowed Nike to generate and maintain a broad portfolio
of options, and -- importantly -- to realize these options at the right time [44].  Thus, an
options or flexibility perspective is directly relevant to strategic management (see [49]; that
it is also relevant to the theory of economic organization is the overall message of this paper.
The options perspective is clearly applicable to markets and hybrids, because
flexibility is very much part of the rationale of these institutions (cf. Hayek, 1945).  But the
perspective may be extended to firms.  As Brian Loasby [30] has recently -- almost
aphoristically -- put it, firms provide contracts for future options, whereas markets provide
options for future contracts.  It is this overall perspective on firms as providing contracts for
future options which I suggest to elaborate in the ensuing pages.  In fact, I shall go
somewhat further than Loasby and argue that we may derive a rationale for firm
organization
 from the options/flexibility perspective.  In this perspective, firms exist because
they can more efficiently coordinate collective learning processes than market organization
is able to. 
My specific design in this paper is the following. The starting point is a general
discussion of adaptation.  Adapting to unforeseen contingencies is the perhaps central
problem of economic organization, and the theory of the firm needs to recognize this more
fully.  Recent work on the theory of the firm has argued that incompleteness of contracts --
that not all future contingencies are covered by the contract -- is a necessary feature in a
sound economic approach to organization [53, 17].  Basically, this is because
incompleteness means that there is room for what is seen in recent work as the crucial
determinant of economic organization, namely problems of aligning incentives. 
However, incomplete contracts are not only important because they provide room
for incentive problems, but perhaps more importantly because a structure of incomplete
contracts is a structure around problem-solving and the learning that flows from the
successful or successful approach to problems.  Here, an open-ended structure is needed,
because problem-solving and learning are activities that by their nature must involve
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by arguing that when processes of learning are strongly complementary -- in the sense that
individual learning processes feed on each other -- these are best organized within a
structure of incomplete contracts supported by centralized control, that is, within a firm.
I take complementarity of individual learning processes to be a defining characteristic of
organizational learning; thus, the organization does not learn if only one member learns
(admittedly, this is somewhat narrow, see [22] for a broader view).
2. Adaptation
As a matter of rational, and perhaps also historical, reconstruction, there are two overall
conceptualizations of the economic problem to be found in the history of economic
doctrines.  The first, and dominant, was perhaps best stated by Stanley Jevons: 
'The problem of economics may, as it seems to me, be stated thus: Given,
a certain population, with various needs and powers of production, in
possession of certain lands and sources of material: required, the mode of
employing their labor which will maximize the utility of the produce' [23,
p. 267].
Thus, in this conceptualization, the economic problem is seen essentially as a static
optimization problem, and there is an implicit presumption that if all data are given to a
single mind, this mind can work out the optimal allocation/distribution patterns [19]. 
Now there are several ways in which this caricature may be relaxed, and, in fact,
is relaxed.  One such way is to take the starting point in what is arguably still the
paradigmatic economic model, namely the Arrow-Debreu model [8], and introduce
transaction costs into it.  This means that at least some forward markets will be closed;
everything cannot be settled at the initial point of time and there will be a need for later
decisions to be made as time and states of nature unfold [45].  In a restricted sense, there
is a need for flexibility.
How radical this solution is arguably depends on how we interpret the notion of
transaction costs.  In one interpretation -- one that is easy to handle in formal models --
4transaction costs are simply a fraction of the resource that is lost for whatever reason in a
transaction.  Thus, transaction costs are not really different from production costs; they are
merely incurred after the product has materialized rather than before.  But in another and
more interesting interpretation, transaction costs are knowledge costs -- in mainstream
theory, the various costs of being asymmetrically and imperfectly informed.  However,
as normally used in mainstream theory, asymmetric and imperfect information and the
transaction costs they imply are properties of a decision problem that is designed by the
theorist as confronting some actor on an ex ante basis.  The design of some institution,
organization or contract is the ex post outcome.  For example, the employer (principal)
initially faces the problem of not precisely knowing the capabilities of the agent he plans to
hire; he knows that he cannot constantly monitor the agent's actions, that there is a
stochastic variable that impinges on the output of the agent, etc.  His choice problem is to
design some incentive scheme that minimizes the guaranteed wage, while still having the
agent sign the contract and supply a high effort-level. 
This basic principal-agent setting has been employed -- with suitable modifications
-- as an economic approach to organization in countless contributions (for overviews, see
[39]).  Critics of the economic turn in organization theory (such as [10]) has argued that it
is excessively methodologically individualist, that it operates with an overly cynical and
unrealistic view of human nature, is too functionalist, etc.  To these methodological critics
may be added a more substantial critique: The overriding problem of handling the major
uncertainties confronting the organization -- including adapting to unforeseen changes -- so
often stressed in much organization theory is neglected in a large part of the economic
approach to organizations. 
The fundamental principal-agent model is not in essence different from Jevons'
conceptualization of the economic problem: although the data of the problem are not known
with certainty, there is an optimal solution to the contract design problem that can be
worked out by the principal at time 0 -- and which continues to be optimal throughout
contract execution.  Thus, there will be no need for adaptation. 
Now adaptation is really the main issue in the second major conceptualization of
the economic problem to found in the history of economic doctrines.  It is perhaps best
5associated with the work of Friedrich von Hayek and his fellow Austrians, but present-day
evolutionary and post-Marshallian economists [46, 47, 29, 30] also belong to this intellectual
current.  The starting premise of this tradition is the Hayekian point that economic problems
are consequences of unexpected change, because it is this kind of change that necessitates
revisions in plans [19].  
It is hard to underestimate the difference between the two traditions (for an attempt
at estimation, see [31]), not the least with respect to how institutions and organizations are
conceptualized.  In the latter -- evolutionary-Austro-Marshallian -- tradition, markets, firms,
and entrepreneurs, are not primarily seen as efficient mechanisms for the allocation of given
resources -- rather, they are seen as agents of a society-wide discovery, or learning, process.
Thus, markets are not primarily efficient incentive mechanisms; instead, they are
embodiments of options, and it is this role that makes markets such effective devices for
adapting to unforeseen changes.  Now options within a market setting are primarily provided
by firms; for example, a firm may vertically disintegrate and instead utilize the options of 'the
market', that is, of potential supplier firms.  This may be a rational response to, for example,
unforeseen changes in the consumer preferences that characterize the firm's own market, as
is the case with Nike confronting a strongly volatile market for athletic shoes [44].  
But the firm may also itself generate contingencies that are not only unforeseen
relative to other firms, but also -- at least to some extent -- to itself.  Firms will do this to
the extent that they engage in learning.  For example, as any innovation theorist will know,
R&D efforts constantly generate surprises, some of which turn out to be serendipitous.
Thus, flexibility is needed, not only in the market context, but also within the firm itself.  In
the following sections, I suggest to expand the options/flexibility perspective from markets
to firms.  The attempt to do this begins with a discussion of contractual incompleteness.
3. Incomplete Contracts
Since Coase [4], contractual incompleteness -- that is, the circumstance that certain
contingencies are not provided for in the contract -- has been an essential, if somewhat
6problematical, feature of the theory of the firm.  As Coase argued, incompleteness is not
only characteristic of employment contracts but also of, for example, long supplier contracts.
In addition to its obvious empirical importance, recent research has demonstrated
that incompleteness of contracts is a necessary condition for telling a convincing story about
the boundaries of firms. This is so because 'comprehensive' (i.e., not-incomplete) contracts
do not allow the analyst to say much about ownership; for example, in a principal-agent
setting, a contract between an independent supplier, and a contract between the manager of
one of the firm's divisions may be completely alike. This implies that in order to tell a
sensible story about the boundaries of the firm -- in recent research interpreted to refer to
what the firm owns and what it doesn't own -- it is necessary to introduce incompleteness
of contracts. In fact, ownership is interpreted to mean the right to control assets under
circumstances that are not contractually stipulated (for the details of the argument, see [17]).
Now to the extent that contractual incompleteness is rationalized -- rather than
simply asserted -- this is done by pointing to bounded rationality, to information costs, or
to some mixture of the two.  Thus, it is impossible for cognitive reasons or too costly to
specify the full decision tree.  For example, the approach of Oliver Hart and John Moore
[18, p. 756] is to '...focus on the cost of writing a contingent clause in a sufficiently and
unambiguous way that it can be enforced'.  But often, there is a presumption that in principle
the relevant information could be included in the contract, if only the parties would bear the
costs of information collection and processing; the information is there, as it were.  As an
exemplification, here is how incompleteness of contracts is described in a recent
contribution:
'Many contracts specifying state-contingent outcomes that economic
agents write to regulate their transactions are incomplete. They neglect
information about the state of the world that is in principle available to the
parties to the contract and would be optimal for them to include' [2, p.
1085].
One of the pioneers in the modern development of incomplete contracts, Oliver
Hart, has recently argued that bounded rationality is not really necessary for the modern
theory of the firm. What is necessary is rather that -- although the parties to a contract may
7in fact conceive of all the relevant contingencies -- they are not able to '...write them down
in a clear enough way that an outside arbiter, such as a court, can verify them' [16, p.698].
One could argue, of course, that this shifts the boundedness of rationality from the
parties to the transaction to the courts. But that is not really the gist of the argument; rather,
it amounts to reducing bounded rationality and the category of the unexpected to a form of
asymmetric information.  For whatever reason, the parties to the contract know something
that cannot be known by the courts. 
Another important formal contributor to the modern theory of economic
organization, David Kreps [26, 27], has adopted a different position.  He seems to accept
bounded rationality, if in a rather hesitant way.  In an explorative paper on how corporate
culture may be interpreted in the context of organizational economics, Kreps explicitly
grapples over several pages with the notion of unforeseen contingencies.  In his theory,
corporate culture is essentially a reputation capital that tells employees of the firm and
external suppliers how the firm will react to unforeseen contingencies.
An important point that Kreps hints at, but does not really explore, is that there are
degrees of 'unexpectedness' -- degrees of surprise, as George Shackle [50] called it --, from
the completely unexpected to that which can be anticipated in rough outline, if not in details.
The important point is that it is possible to provide for the latter kind of unexpectedness: 
'Introspection suggests that while a particular contingency may be
unforeseen, provision for it is not completely impossible. While the exact
circumstances of future contingencies may be unimaginable (or too costly
to think through), aspects of those contingencies follow patterns' [26,
p.117].
Kreps goes on to argue that it is possible to formally model behavior designed to meet
partially unexpected contingencies, and a formal later paper [27] in fact undertakes such
modelling.  But it is perhaps not the exact choice theoretic dimension of Kreps' discussion
that is the most appealing aspect -- at least in the context of the present paper --, but rather
his suggestion that various 'remedies that may or may not be applicable to a wide range of
circumstances' [26, p. 117] exist precisely because of their role in meeting unforeseen
8contingencies.  His examples are cash and fire extinguishers -- but the perspective may be
extended to firm.  
In fact, Kreps [26, 27] himself does this, by arguing that governance structures are
adopted by agents that are sufficiently rational to expect the unanticipated, as it were.  This
is quite credible, since it simply seems to be a commonplace observation that agents choose
governance structures -- for example, types of relational contracting -- that really do provide
mechanisms for adaptation to partially unanticipated contingencies.  But it is quite another
thing, and much less credible, to say that agents are so rational that they can choose on an
ex ante basis the transaction cost minimizing governance structure. In fact, this runs directly
counter to the idea of bounded rationality (cf. [11]).
4. Contracts and Learning
In the mainstream theory of economic organization, contractual incompleteness is seen as
important because it -- in conjunction with opportunistic/morally hazardous behavior and
relation-specific investments -- helps determine patterns of ownership, for example, of the
firm's physical assets [17].  And in a sense, there is a 'negative' dimension to incompleteness,
because incompleteness provides leeway for opportunism.  This is also true for contributions
such as Kreps [26] that explicitly tries to make a bridge to more organizational and
behaviorally oriented studies.
But there is another -- perhaps more 'positive' -- way of conceptualizing incomplete
contracts, namely as structures around problem-solving.  As Coase noted in connection
with a discussion of long-term contracts,
'...owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period for the
contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible,
and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify
what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well be a
matter of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity
which of several courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of
that service or commodity. But the purchaser will not know which of
9these several courses he will want the supplier to take. Therefore, the
service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact
details being left until a later date' [4, p. 84].
Coase here begins to talk about a long-term, incomplete contract between a firm and its
supplier -- that is, between two independent firms -- but then slips directly into associating
the firm with hierarchical direction: 'When the direction of resources...becomes dependent
on the supplier in this way, that relationship which I term "the firm" may be obtained' [4, p.
84].  He admits [4, p. 96n10] that there may be more or less direction, and that it is,
accordingly, hard to draw a hard and fast line between the firm and the market. 
However, Coase's own discussion suggests that the firm-hierarchy choice somehow
turns on the character of the problem solving that is involved in the relation. In particular,
if the relevant problem-solving relate to activities that are closely complementary -- strongly
inter-connected -- achieving efficient coordination may require common ownership [46,
p.83, 32, 36] (I return to this later).
Problem-solving is an activity with distinctly hierarchical and complementary
features.  Thus, one solves problems by dividing problems into sub-problems, solving these
sub-problems, checking whether the solved sub-problems imply a solution to the overall
problem, performing further solution of the sub-problems if they do not fit into an overall
solution, etc.  In other words, problem-solving begins with the generic features, then moves
down the hierarchy in terms of detail.  This process of decomposing problems and solving
sub-problems is clearly a conjectural -- trial and error -- process [29, 30]; for example, one
cannot ex ante be certain that one has performed the right decomposition.  Moreover, one
does not know ex ante that the solved sub-problems fit into a larger-scale solution -- that
the right relation of complementarity has been achieved; that, too, is a conjecture.
As any modern organizational theorist knows, hierarchical coordination -- at least
in an evolving environment and in firms of more than negligible complexity -- is very much
characterized by these features.  It is therefore essentially a learning process, rather than a
matter of simply and mechanistically issuing the right commands and underscoring these by
the right incentives and the right doses of monitoring (as in organizational economics, see
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[39]).  This may be illustrated by referring to important recent work by Luigi Marengo [34].
Taking his cues from Cyert and March [7], Marengo is particularly interested in the
coordination of individual learning processes inside the firm, and how a stock of
organizational knowledge emerges from the interaction of these learning processes. In his
simulation model, agents do not have any prior knowledge of the environment they are
facing and they do not possess a shared partition of the states of the world (that is, there is
no common knowledge). 
However, such a shared partition is necessary for coordination  - for example,
understanding the demand of the exogenous market and coordinating this with the different
shops inside the firm -  to take place. And, in fact, as demonstrated by Marengo's
simulations, coordination emerges gradually and spontaneously, as agents interact under
given organizational structures and under the impact of given environments.  However, the
precise character and content of the organizational knowledge stock is inherently
unpredictable.  It is, in effect, a partly unforeseen contingency. 
This casts a quite different light over the incompleteness of contracts, one that does
not focus on the potential for opportunistic or morally hazardous behavior created by
incompleteness.  Rather, a structure of incomplete contracts is necessary for coordination.
Moreover, incompleteness may be of distinct value because it allows the firm to learn, to
develop its competences, to create (and realize) options, to benefit from emergent -- and
therefore partially unforeseen -- strategies.  Thus, to the extent that an essential part of the
nature of the firm is its role as a strategy-making entity, this role is best understood in the
context of a framework of incomplete contracts.
The bottom-line really is that contractual incompleteness is an instrument of
adaptation.  Importantly, it allows the firm to adapt to and exploit partly unanticipated
learning which the firm itself generates, such as serendipities in R&D, emergent strategies,
etc.  That such an instrument is in fact necessary follows from a basic epistemological
impossibility theorem: future learning and knowledge cannot be fully anticipated, for if it
could, it would be present knowledge and not future knowledge [41] . 
Thus, incomplete contracts allow for the generation inside firms of new options and
the realization of the those options -- in short, it allows the working of a process of variety
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generation and selection that is internal to firms [51].  Since individual learning processes,
and perhaps even more so, organizational learning processes, imply the emergence of
unforeseen contingencies, incompleteness of contracts and (organizational) learning would
seem to be closely intertwined concepts.  The emergence of a stock of organizational
knowledge requires a framework of incomplete contracts -- one that is supplied by firm
organization.  This in turn suggests that there may some intimate relation between
organizational learning and the existence of the firm.  I discuss this next.
5. Knowledge, Direction, and Flexibility
The prevailing theories of the existence of firms are almost all based on the claim that firm
organization allows for better investments in relation-specific assets that markets do, and
that firms exist for this reason [53, 17].  These theories are incentive-based, rather than
knowledge-based, in the sense that the alignment of incentives is seen as the overriding issue
of economic organization; it is essentially because incentives to invest in relation-specific
assets are perverse under market organization that firms exist.  As a more general matter,
organizational forms reflect ways of damping or solving potential incentive problems.
Moreover, notions of morally hazardous behavior -- such as opportunism -- are seen to be
necessary in order to satisfactorily address the existence of firms.  Considerations of
knowledge accumulation and utilization appear at most implicitly. 
However, Harold Demsetz [9] argued that morally hazardous behavior is not really
necessary for understanding the existence of the firm.  Instead, he suggested that there is an
intimate link between knowledge and hierarchical direction, a link that, therefore, accounts
for the existence of firms.  As Demsetz explained: 
'Firms and industries must form a pattern of economic organization that
takes account of the need for acquiring knowledge in a more specialized
fashion than the manner in which it will be used. Those who are to
produce on the basis of this knowledge, but are not possessed of it
themselves, must have their activities directed by those who possess
(more of) the knowledge. Direction substitutes for education (that is, for
the transfer of the knowledge itself)' [9, p. 159].
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According to Demsetz, it is therefore specialization in terms of knowledge that provides the
ultimate reason for the existence of hierarchical direction and (therefore) the firm. 
A further stride forward in the construction of a knowledge-based theory of the
firm has recently been taken by Kathleen Conner and C.K. Prahalad [6].  They argue that
firms exist because they are often better able than markets to cultivate what they call a
'knowledge-substitution effect' and a 'flexibility effect'. As a general matter, knowledge-
substitution
 refers to how the knowledge endowments of different agents are applied in a
productive venture (actually, 'knowledge-direction' would perhaps be a better word).  As
a starting point, each agent is presumed to have access to his own endowment of
knowledge.  However, the insights and knowledge of different agents may be made available
to other agents, for example, through apprenticeship, through suggestions in
communication, and through hierarchical direction.  Knowledge-substitution takes place
when the knowledge of a superior is used for directing the actions of a sub-ordinate, that
is, when the latter is told to perform some activity.  As indicated by the above quotation
from Demsetz, hierarchical direction epitomizes knowledge-substitution.
Assuredly, knowledge-substitution may take place in a market setting (as when I
instruct a gardener as to how my garden should be fixed).  However, to the extent that the
hierarchy reduces, for example, bargaining costs, knowledge-substitution may perform more
efficiently within the firm than in the market [6, 37].  The typical arguments advanced in
favor of this view, is that firm organization -- because of the continuity of association
between inputs -- is an efficient vehicle for cultivating and offering a shared frame of
reference -- a stock of organizational knowledge -- whereas market organization cannot
develop and offer a cognitive frame of reference that is equally fine-grained. 
The flexibility effect
 refers to the superior flexibility that hierarchy may obtain
relative to market contracting in influencing input-owners' actions in response to partly
unexpected new developments and new learning [4, 28, 6].  This goes directly to the heart
of what has been said up til now about organizational learning and incomplete contracts. 
As has also already been observed, what Conner and Prahalad call the flexibility
effect is a feature of firms that has been strangely missing from most of the contractual
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literature on firm organization.  It is strange, considering that the issue was placed right at
the center of the theory of the firm by Ronald Coase, as witnessed by the above quotation
from Coase [4] (Section 4). 
The firm may obtain superior flexibility, because the hierarchy may economize on
bargaining costs relative to market organization in the case of meeting and handling major
unforeseen contingencies.  Moreover, flexibility is facilitated because firm organization
supplies a stock of organizational knowledge that reduces various information and
coordination costs because it eases the interpretation, communication, and handling of
unforeseen contingencies.  
Crucially, the flexibility function affects the dynamics of knowledge-acquisition and
organizational learning -- it allows rapid response to new developments and new learning,
because it does not require renegotiation of contracts (as market contracting possibly
would).  In the following, I utilize these ideas for deriving a knowledge-based rationale for
the firm that is in conformity with the options/flexibility theme that has been the overall
theme of this paper. 
6. Strategy, Learning, and the Existence of Firms
Recent strategy thinking has been much more open to the idea of viewing firms as
embodying flexibility and the generation of new options through organizational learning than
has contemporary economics.  In an extremely influential article, C.K. Prahalad and Gary
Hamel [43], highlighted what they called 'the core competence of the corporation', and
defined it as '...the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate
diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technology' [43, p.84].  Core
competence is important because it feeds the firm's options generating capability, that is,
creates the possibilities to 'spawn new unanticipated products' (ibid.).  
Building on Prahalad and Hamel's work, Costas Markides and Peter Williamson
[35] constructed a detailed taxonomy of firm asset dynamics.  Some of these asset dynamics
refer to more static exploitation of given assets.  This is the case, for example, of what they
14
called 'asset amortization', that is, the potential to reap economies of scope across strategic
business units that can share the same asset, and also, to a smaller extent, of what they called
'asset improvement', that is, the potential to use a competence accumulated in the course of
building/maintaining a strategic asset in one business unit to help improve an existing
strategic asset in another strategic business unit.  But they also introduced the concepts of
'asset creation', that is, the potential to utilize a competence developed through the
experience of building strategic assets in existing businesses, to create a new asset in a new
business, and 'asset fission', that is, the potential for the process of related diversification to
expand an organization's existing pool of competences because, as it builds strategic assets
in a new business, it will learn new skills that in turn will allow to improve the existing assets
in existing businesses.  
Now these asset dynamics involve -- as described by Markides and Williamson --
processes of organizational learning, some more exploitative, some more explorative (to use
March's [33] terms).  The bottomline is that they all involve a collective and synergistic
dimension to the relevant learning.  A more traditionally economic way of phrasing this is
to say that there are (Edgeworth) complementarities between the relevant activities, such
as relevant strategic business units [32, 36].  Formally, complementarity between, say, two
activities obtains when doing more of one of the activities increases the yield from doing
more of the other activities, and vice versa.
For example, when Samsung Electronics Co. in these years strongly expands its
number of strategic business units and alliances within the broad area of electronics, this is
because they conjecture that there may be many complementarities between the relevant
activities, and that this will foster the collective learning of the organization, increase the
number of options Samsung is able to create (e.g., new product options), and hence upgrade
the stock of collective knowledge of the corporation [40].  For example, accumulating
knowledge within some aspect of computer technology may feed on the accumulation of
knowledge within some are of telecom and vice versa, particularly when these two overall
streams of technology are converging.  There may for Samsung exist a complementarity in
the specific sense that the marginal return of accumulating knowledge within computer
technology is increasing in the level of the stock of knowledge about telecom, and vice
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versa.  Thus, there may be a self-propelling aspect of the process of providing options
through organizational learning.
Because firms come equipped with incomplete contracts, and a supporting infra-
structure of corporate cultures [26] and management heuristics [42], they may under certain
circumstances be the proper framework around the process of providing new options and
realizing these; with Loasby [30], they may indeed 'provide contracts for future options'.
They may not always be the proper framework -- for path-dependencies, organizational
rigidities of all kinds, framing effects, and much else may stifle the process of creating and
realizing options [48].  Moreover, for some types of learning -- for example, learning within
a modular system -- markets may actually be superior to firms (see the analysis in [28]).  
In terms of the previous discussion, what may allow firms to provide and realize
new options -- to carry out new strategies based on previous organizational learning -- is
precisely the operation of the flexibility and the knowledge substitution effects.  Clearly,
creating new options through processes of organizational learning involving various
complementarities must involve creating unforeseen contingencies; as a result this process
requires contractual incompleteness.  But in order to turn organizational learning and the
options this may create into commercially viable products, leadership and management is
required; flexibility must be exploited to be attractive and this is done, at least partly, by
hierarchical direction -- that is, by knowledge-substitution.  
We may found a rationale for the firm in these ideas, that is to say, by combining
our overall view of the firm as an entity that provides new options through a process of
organizational learning that is underpinned by a structure of incomplete contracts.  One
important component of such a rationale lies in relations of complementarity between intra-
firm assets and activities.
Organizational economists Paul Milgrom and John Roberts [36, 38] have treated
such relations of complementarity in production in much detail.  They refer to the
coordination problems that may arise between complementary activities as 'coordination
problems with design attributes' (design problems', for short).  More specifically, these are
problems with two important features.  First, there is some knowledge of the form of the
optimal solution, that is, how relevant variables should be related (for example, the effort
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levels of workers in a team).  Second, failing to achieve the right relation between the
variables is more costly than other errors, including minor misspecifications of the overall
pattern, as long as the individual activities fit [38, p. 91]. Mundane examples may be the
sport of crew, the performance of a ballet company or a symphony orchestra.  These are
examples of synchronization problems; assignment problems may other examples.  Firms
often solve design problems by routinization which makes possible a certain amount of
decentralized decision-making. 
But decentralization often performs poorly to the extent that the optimal resource
allocation significantly depends on the use of knowledge that is not given to personnel at the
operating level [38, p.92].  Organizational restructuring, new product launches, the
stimulation of inter-divisional knowledge flows, etc. are examples of design problems with
an innovation attribute.  These problems -- which normally will involve the emergence of
some unforeseen contingencies -- favor intensive knowledge flows and some extent of
centralized control.  Thus, to the extent that the firm may be seen as providing contracts for
new options, this is accompanied by some measure of centralized control.
The severity of design problem hinges on the degree of complementarity that is
involved.  As Harald Malmgren [32] suggested, the existence of the firm is explainable as
an efficient response to severe design problems:
'I wish to suggest...that where output and profitability of various
production units are closely interdependent, the firm is formed to
undertake decisions concerning all or some of the production units
simultaneously, so as to maximize the joint profit and total output'  [32,
p.412]. 
In terms of the present discussion, we may use this idea to argue that when the
provision and exploitation of options involve activities that are strongly complementary, the
firm is formed.  In other words, the firm is needed when there is strong interdependence
between the various learning processes that result in new options.  The coordination of such
learning processes requires a framework of incomplete contracts, because there is a need for
being able to react to and adapt to unforeseen contingencies that arise during the process
of learning (i.e., the flexibility effect).  Specifically, some measure of centralized control --
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some knowledge-substitution -- is needed for such design problems with innovation
attributes.  Thus, hierarchical direction within a framework of incomplete contracts -- that
is, a firm -- is needed. 
Conversely, providing and exploiting options that do not involve strongly
complementary processes of learning -- for example, inventing and producing a new
component within a standardized hi-fi system -- can be left to markets [28].  Essentially, this
is because there are no real design problems; these have already been solved by the provision
of a standard. 
7. Concluding Comments
The firm, organizational economist say, is a nexus of contracts.  This way of putting things
is important both for what it says and for what it says only implicitly.  It is important, of
course, because it directs our attention towards the property rights and incentive schemes
of firms; but it is also important because of its omissions, its lack of attention to some
important implications of the involved contracts.  
It has been argued that the incompleteness of contracts is not only important to the
theory of economic organization because it provides the necessary leeway for post-
contractual strategic behavior in the form 'opportunism' under the impact of partly
unforeseen contingencies.  Incompleteness of contracts is also important because incomplete
contracts provide room for partially unexpected and potentially beneficial organizational
learning and because it allows the process of hierarchical direction to take place.
Thus, rather than being a problem (because it opens the door to incentive
problems), the incompleteness of contracts is a distinct virtue because it provides room for
knowledge accumulation and for experimentation.  It is precisely the incompleteness of
contracts that allows the firm to function as an adaptive, cognitive system. 
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